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Introduction
I.  Economic Reform / Open policy and the Changing Role of the SEZs
II.  Economic Performance of the SEZs
Introduction
  Since the implementation of economic reform policy in 1979, China’s economic development is quite
impressive with her average annual rate of economic growth of over 10 % between 1980 and 1995 increasing
her GDP from 451.8 billion yuan (or RMB) to 5,826 billion yuan (at current price) (1).  This was by far the
highest rate of growth in Asia during this period. The establishment of China's Special Economic Zones
(SEZs henceforth) apparently had triggered her economic growth together with various growth-oriented
schemes.  As a result of enhanced economic growth in China after the reform and open policy was launched
in the late 1970s, the SEZs entered a new era when the on-going development policy needed to be
reconsidered. This accelerated economic development had brought forth at the same time considerable
regional disparities, economic and social problems.
  Within two decades after the formation of the SEZs and introduction of new industrial policy, China stood
at the crossroads and faced the challenge of pursuing further development in an entirely new environment.
Problems of various type arose at each stage of development of the SEZs, leading to a heated discussion
concerning the Government policy of industrialization. If China is following the 'Geese-flying pattern' of
development, what had taken place in the Asian newly industrializing economies (NIES henceforth) (i.e.,
Taiwan, Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore) followed by the ASEAN countries was likely to take place in
China, and the lessons of East Asian Export Processing Zones (hereafter EPZs) might be applicable to the
SEZs, since the role of China's SEZs in her accelerated economic development seemed to be fairly
comparable to that of the EPZs in high performing East Asian countries.  The first Asian EPZ installed at
Kaoshiung, Taiwan as an essential part of outward industrialization strategy was a key element in Taiwan’s
economic achievement from thenceforth.  However, underlying differences between China and East Asian
countries might be too large to apply the East Asian development model.  With its characteristic background
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of her socialist economy, a vast size of spread-out land and enormous regional diversity, China's industrial
development may not be able to follow a similar growth pattern known as the East Asian model.  Yet we
have to admit that China's Special Economic Zones share some common features with Asian Export
Processing Zones which were an integral component of export-oriented industrialization (hereafter EOI)
policy package for the NIES countries specifically Korea and Taiwan. Even though some fundamental
differences exist between China's SEZs and East Asian EPZs in other Asian countries, the experiences of the
EPZs might be applicable and provide some lessons to China's SEZ at the crossroads.
  Here in this paper an investigation is made into the changing role of SEZs in the context of China’s
economic development, and some of the emerging problems SEZs were confronted with at the new stage of
development will be taken up for analysis. An emphasis is laid here on study of policy and performance of
the SEZs in comparison with those of Asian EPZs which had managed to shift their industrialization strategy
from the import-substitution to the export-orientation at the critical stage of development. The SEZs were in a
better position to elicit lessons from the experiences of Asian EPZs, despite various conditions and
limitations prevailing in China’s 'socialist' market economy.
I.  Economic Reform / Open policy and the Changing Role of the SEZs
1.  Background of the open policy
  The SEZs originated from the ‘Four Modernizations Slogan’ used by former prime minister Chou Enlai as
early as in 1964.  After Deng Xiaoping’s rehabilitation in 1977, he promoted four modernization programs,
i.e. the modernization of agriculture, industry, science and technology, and national defense by the use of
practical planning that had involved capitalistic incentives and techniques. The main purpose of the four
modernizations was to quadruple China’s 1980 GNP of RMB 480 billion to RMB 1800 billion by the year
2000.  Until the start of modernization programs China's external economic policy was rather self-contained
and self-reliant, limiting her trade and investment to an inward-looking and import-substituting type which
had significantly kept her economy stagnant and underutilized. Her long-standing political and economic
upheavals and series of ideological conflicts since the Mao period had confined her socialist economic policy
closed and isolated. Deng's reform was intended to animate her stagnant economy by opening the economy to
the outside world and by revitalizing the system through the introduction of foreign capital and technology.
When Asian NIES emerged with their remarkable economic success toward the mid 1970s, there was a
growing awareness of China’s technological backwardness far behind developed countries, inducing the
government to place the top priority on technological advance to catch-up by opening the country
Industrial Policy in Transitional Economy : The Role of China’s Special Economic Zone in Economic Development (Part I) 131
(Oborne,1986).  Based on the decision adopted at the 11th Communist party meeting in 1978 to implement
economic reform and open policy led by Deng, the SEZs were created as an integral part of this policy: Four
SEZs were set up in 1980, three of them; Shenzhen (near Hong Kong), Zhuhai(near Macao) , Shantou(a
major home of overseas Chinese) located in Guangdong Province and one at Xiamen (across Taiwan) in
Fujian Province. Fifth SEZ was installed in Hainan Island in 1988 at the time of promotion of the area to the
Province status, aiming at developing still largely untapped island economically and socially.  These SEZs
were all located along the coast which had easy access to sea transport over centuries.
  A great step came forward as a part of open policy package with the announcement in 1984 that the
experiments of the SEZs would be extended to larger areas inside the country and fourteen coastal open port
cities would be opened with special investment incentives for foreign joint ventures(2). Economic and
technical zones were installed in these coastal cities with a view to developing emerging businesses and
technology-intensive industries.  In February 1985, three coastal areas (Pearl River Delta, Southern Fujian
Delta, Yangze River Delta) were designated as Open Economic Zones (OEZs) endowed with similar
preferential incentives to promote export production and inflow of foreign capital(3).  Shanghai and its
surrounding areas were thus incorporated in the open policy program.  These coastal regions were all
conferred with favorable conditions and special status that were conducive to development of export-oriented
economy. China's development strategy introduced in these coastal areas was therefore a natural product of
the preceding experiments undertaken to achieve further economic development under new economic
circumstances that had necessitated the participation in the international division of labor, exploitation of
international market and resources, and at the same time establishment of market economy system in the
country. The basic standpoint of the Chinese Government however was that the SEZs would remain the
foundation of coastal development within the framework of reform-and-open policy.
2.  Special Economic Zone policy
  The SEZs were initially established after the model of EPZs, especially in Taiwan and Korea which had
already achieved a significant success (4).  It is to be noted that within a year before the formation of the
three SEZs in Guangdong Province was announced, a small piece of land (about one square kilometer in
Shekou) was marked out in Shenzhen as an export processing zone (Sit, 1985).The SEZs were originally
intended to serve as a place for testing new reforms of enterprise management, finance and labor matters,
which, if found successful, could be applied throughout the country. This was one of the Beijing
Government's experiments undertaken for integrated development in the SEZs in order to liven her flagging
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economy (5).  The fundamental object of the SEZs and open cities was to invite foreign investment in various
industries with preferential measures and incentives such as preferential tax status to foreign investors, lower
tariffs, better infrastructure, more flexible labor markets, and less bureaucratic control (Panagariya, 1993) (6).
A variety of industries including not only manufacturing industries but also service industries (such as hotels,
retails, tourist industries), agriculture, housing construction and infra-structural development were all
encouraged and open to foreign investment. After a careful study of the existing EPZs in East Asia, the
Chinese Government had developed the original EPZs concept into a new economic zone called the ‘SEZ’ (7).
  China's SEZs represented a unique approach to economic development, inflow of foreign investment, and
technology transfer for a country that had long advocated inward-looking self-containment policy under her
socialist regime.  They are also unique because Chinese policymakers sought, for the first time, to actively
link foreign investment with trade in these specific areas.  By providing preferential treatment and broader
facilities for foreign investment and trade, the SEZs marked the turning point to break with the self-reliant,
inward-looking strategy of the Maoist period to switch to the open policy or moderate outward-looking
strategy. The four SEZs and Hainan Island together with other fourteen open coastal cities constituted multi-
functional and multifarious front for open door policy.  The location of four SEZs were chosen because they
were in close proximity to Hong Kong and Taiwan enabling them easy access to information, technology,
management know-hows and capital from neighboring as well as from foreign developed areas with their
relatively developed facilities of communication and transport.  In addition to these economic factors,
political considerations were also involved in determining the location of SEZs in Guangdong and Fujian
Province.   With the anticipated return of Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan to China, it was important for the
Government to reduce income gap as much as possible between SEZs and these neighboring areas so as to
undertake integration process smoothly.  Another consideration in the selection of SEZs location far away
from the major centers of population and industry was to confine the possible disruptions of the SEZs within
the existing order. (Wong(1987),  UNCTC (1991). p.242). The expected role of these SEZs could be spelled
out as follows ((Oborne(1986), UNCTC(1991), Wall(1991), Park (1996)).
  (i) Transfer of hi-tech industries into the SEZs;
  (ii) Experiment and acquisition of modern technology and management expertise;
  (iii) Creation of employment;
  (iv) Earning of foreign exchange through promotion of exports;
  (v) Promotion of economic development and regional development;
  (vi) Creation of economic links to the domestic economy with Hong Kong (close to Shenzhen), Macao
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(close to Zhuhai),Taiwan (close to Xiamen) and overseas Chinese communities(Shantou);
  (vii) Experiment of new economic reform with market forces;
  (viii) Setting-up of a link between the economic hinterland and overseas.
  The SEZs were virtually integral pillars to support the outward-looking strategy. China’s SEZ, though it
had evolved from the free trade zone concept, had developed into a unique model of its own particularly in
light of its socialist setting (Wong= Cai= Chen, 1992).
3.  The role of the SEZs compared with those of EPZs
  The EPZ introduced as one tool of the policy packages of the outward-oriented development strategy in
Taiwan and Korea has been highly responsible for their rapid economic development in Taiwan and Korea.
Flourishing free port cities in Hong Kong and Singapore had long been another example of the economic
potential once the trade zone was deregulated. The success of the EPZs and free port cities in the Asian NIES
apparently had set the model for China’s SEZs to learn the lesson from.
  The SEZ and EPZ are both variations of a free trade zone, but the SEZ is a more comprehensive economic
zone of considerable size than the EPZ, not a small enclave within a city engaged in modern export-
processing of manufacturing production. The physical space of the SEZ is generally much larger than the
average size of the EPZs which were often less than 10 square kilometers (Crane, 1991). The original zone of
Shenzhen SEZ, for example, had an area of 327 square kilometers and expanded Xiamen SEZ included the
whole of Xiamen Island. Hainan Island was in fact China’s largest SEZ.  However, the scope of the SEZ is
much limited when compared with that of free port cities such as Hong Kong and Singapore fully equipped
with absolute autonomy.  As opposed to the EPZ, SEZ’s economic activity is far more extensive covering a
wide range of business activities whereas the conventional type of the EPZ mainly focused on processing and
assembly in the manufacturing industry for export.  The SEZs were, by all accounts, more ambitious than
the EPZ in terms of industrial policies and activities.
  Asian EPZs provided with their combined strength of both free trade zone and industrial zone (8) were, at
the initial stage of development, mainly engaged in the production of export-oriented, labor-intensive, light
manufacturing goods produced with their cheap wage and they gradually began to shift to the production of
technology-intensive goods. The SEZs, by contrast, the concept of which being born out of bold economic
reform and open policy, were accorded a wider range of status and functions , i.e. a substantial autonomy
assured to the SEZs and simplified administrative structure encompassing planning administrations, state
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banking and insurance(9). Nonetheless the roles of the SEZs were shared by the EPZs in many ways. Among
afore-mentioned eight roles, what the SEZs had basically differed from the EPZs were, (i) Transfer of high-
tech industry into the SEZ, and (vii) Experiment of new economic reform with market forces. Major
differences between the two may be attributable to the fact that Chinese government had expected the SEZs
to serve not only as laboratories for economic reform but also as a window and a bridge to link with the
developed countries. But the fundamental difference between the two is that the former operates in a market
economy, while the latter are set in a centrally planned environment. Within the EPZs the governments
simply removed or eased constraints which had limited the operation of market forces elsewhere in the
economy. In China's SEZs, however, the aim was to create market environment in the zones, while
maintaining intensive control mechanisms for the rest of the economy (Wall, 1991).
  A majority of operating firms in the EPZs were of foreign origin and established by foreign investment (in
most cases jointly ventured) and they were only engaged in export production of manufactured goods, as
against firms and capital invested in SEZs were either of domestic or foreign origin, and their manufactured
products were sold in China as well as overseas markets, though their emphasis was placed on export.
  After all, the SEZs were special but enlarged enclaves endowed with limited administrative autarky within
a planned socialist economy, and were allowed to perform in line with the policies especially designed for
them under direct State planning, whereas the EPZs deficient in conditions for a special enclave were
established mainly for export promotion with various preferential measures within a market economy.   The
characteristics of China’s SEZ as a development policy should be evaluated taking into account the following.
The EPZ was introduced at the time when East Asian countries especially Taiwan and Korea intensified their
efforts to produce light industry manufactured goods for export after they had abandoned their import-
substitution industrialization (ISI hereafter) strategy to switch to the EOI strategy. When we look back
economic development in Asian countries since the 1950s, this ISI strategy was commonly adopted at the
earlier stage of development to foster fledging industries provided with various protective measures.
Important measures, above all, included limitation of import of foreign competitive goods except capital
goods with prohibitive tariffs imposed.  At this stage, strenuous efforts were made by the government as
well as by firms to introduce advanced technology and know-hows to upgrade quality of their products. This
inward-looking ISI strategy only held good until developing country’s (hereafter DC) manufactured goods
became fully competitive at international markets. This protective ISI strategy will have to shift to the EOI
sooner or later as the production capacity of a DC expands, fulfilling its limited market with her domestic
products, and as her balance of trade ran into deep deficits, which was in due course inevitable as
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development stage advanced under the ISI strategy.   At this stage, an outward-looking EOI strategy will be
pursued. The DCs started producing predominantly for export by introducing various measures especially in
the EPZs to enhance inflow of foreign capital and technology through which the DCs could proceed
industrialization.  In contrast with this typical development pattern in East Asia and other DCs operating
within a market economy, China’s inward-looking development strategy differed substantially from the so-
called import-substitution industrialization policy.  China's development policy during the Maoist period
was fundamentally self-reliant with her limited dependence on foreign capital and technology with an
emphasis laid on heavy industry rather than on light industry.  Unlike the Asian EPZ established as an
integral tool of the EOI strategy after the completion of the ISI stage of development, China's SEZs were not
created as a natural outcome of economic development under the ISI strategy. In a way, China, skipping the
development stage of the ISI, had entered the EOI stage with the experimental implementation of economic
reform. China's SEZ was certainly an essential tool of outward-oriented strategy but at the same time many of
foreign-funded firms in the SEZs were engaged in import-substituting production.  In this sense the role of
the SEZ in China's economic development reflected the dual character of the EOI and ISI (Crane,1991).
4.  Lesson from the Asian EPZs
  The idea of modern EPZ was initially an Irish invention. After the first EPZ began operation at Shannon
Airport in Ireland in 1959, the EPZs began to appear in the developing world in the mid-1960s.  The first
Asian EPZ established at Kaoshiung, Taiwan in the mid 1960s was one of the most successful EPZs out of
more than hundred EPZs of the same type, setting the model to be followed in terms of foreign trade and
efficiency. The EPZs were starting up in increasing numbers by the 1970s throughout Asia, Latin America,
Africa and the Middle East. This swift diffusion can be partly explained by the initial successes of the Irish
Shannon Export Free Zone, Taiwan EPZs and partly by several attractive features connected with the enclave
structure of the zones in developing countries (10) since many of the DCs had been disappointed with the ISI
strategy commonly adopted. The principal aim of the EPZ was to promote the inflow of foreign direct
investment to serve as a vehicle for,
  1)  Increasing foreign exchange earnings by exporting new products and finding markets,
  2)  Providing jobs, supplementing the incomes of their families thereby raising the standards of living.
  3)  Upgrading skills of the local manpower,
  4)  Creating linkages with the hinterland,
  5)  Transmitting new technology by training local people (11).
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  This EOI strategy followed closely on the coming of age of multinational corporations (henceforth MNCs)
which had since the 1950s rapidly developed from their earlier involvement in the extractive and
infrastructure sectors into the manufacturing sector in the developing countries. The MNCs, many of which
were operating in the EPZs, had played an important role of expanding exports of manufactured goods from
the DCs in raising the DCs' share of world exports of manufactures almost three times within twenty years
from 1965 (from 4.6% in 1965 to 13.1 % in 1984) (ILO,1989).  It turned out that the EPZs have not only
attracted the large and well-established MNCs from Europe and the US but also have formed a breeding
ground for inexperienced MNCs and even for MNCs from the DCs. This was especially the case in Asia,
where the rapid industrialization and accumulated experience primarily in the NIES countries had enabled
them to engage in foreign production (Johansson, 1994). The establishment of the EPZs or FTZs (Free Trade
Zones) was instrumental in pursuing this EOI strategy undertaken by the Asian NIES countries during the
1960s and 1970s.
  In the early 1970s when the EPZs were gaining popularity, three major objectives of the EPZs were
articulated: foreign exchange earnings, employment creation and technology transfer.  Competition among
host countries for "footloose" processing activities meant that individual countries generally had found it
more difficult to attract foreign investment. While the first two objectives were somehow met to the extent
that firms were attracted, the substantial gains from "technology transfer" had not occurred at the earlier
period, since the EPZs were generally isolated from the domestic economy (Warr,1988). Major industries in
the EPZs were confined to the following two footloose industries in the earlier stage; textile / clothes industry
and electronics industry. The products in these industries were low skilled and labor-intensive.  The MNCs
had invested in the EPZs in many cases to exploit cheap labor and generous incentives offered which were, in
the main, the sources of international competitiveness.  The success of the EPZs made possible by an
increase in exports has led to a rapid economic growth together with an increase in income level. The wage
increase gradually began to erode their competitive edge which had stemmed from low-cost labor. An
impending option for Hong Kong and South Korea or Taiwan, for example, was to relocate existing
production based on low-cost labor to countries where cheaper labor were available and non-binding quotas
were imposed. As economic development advanced in these countries, an emphasis had shifted from labor-
intensive, low value-added to high-tech, high value-added technology industry in the selection of inward FDI,
forcing their industries of comparative disadvantage to relocate in the less developed, lower wage
countries/regions including the SEZs.
  The performances of Asian EPZs were, however, quite varied ranging from poor to satisfactory. Out of 21
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Asian EPZs that had existed toward the end of 1970s, only a few could have matured after passing through
formative periods(12). Among the successful are the Taiwan and South Korean EPZs established in the mid-
1960s and early 1970s.  About two-thirds of the total number of firms (483) in Asian EPZs at the end of the
1970s were located in five EPZs in Taiwan (three EPZs)and Korea (two EPZs). The EPZs in two countries
were entering a new stage of development at that point. Due largely to their continued rise in labor costs
brought forth by economic development, a number of new investments became marginal, being directed
mainly to technology-intensive industries.  As a result, labor-intensive industries were rapidly losing
international competitiveness. In Taiwan's EPZs, many of those labor-intensive industries were closed down
or forced out of EPZs to transfer to other less developed countries such as Thailand, Indonesia, Mexico, etc.
where sufficient labor force was available at lower wage (Asian Productivity Organization, 1983)(13).  The
number of closures in Taiwan EPZs was rapidly increasing over the years, i.e. 9 in 1975, 15 in 1976, 18 in
1977 and 21 each in 1978 and 1979 (14), though Taiwan's EPZs are reputed to be most successful together
with Korean EPZs. However the number of incoming firms into the Taiwan EPZs made up for and kept the
total number of operating firms fairly constant between 220 and 250 after the mid-1980s up to the mid-1990s.
But the total amount of FDI into the Taiwan EPZs had dramatically increased over 100 times in 30 years
from US15.6 million dollars(1967) to US1,930 million dollars(1997) reflecting the changing pattern of FDI
into more technology and capital intensive type(15). In Korean case, the total number of firms in the Masan
EPZ established near Pusan in 1970 first rose drastically earlier from 4 firms in 1970 and reached its peak of
115 firms in 1973 but gradually reduced to 75 around the mid 1980s and stayed constant between 70 and 75
during the 1987-1995 period. Like the Taiwan case, the total value of export from the Masan EPZ had
increased dramatically almost 250 times in 23 years from 9.7million US dollars in 1972 to 2.4 billion US
dollars in 1998 (Korea Ministry of Industry and Trade,1998).
  The contribution of the electronics and electric appliance goods export (83%(1998) in Taiwan, 84%(1995)
in Korea) is responsible for the rapid increase in the value of total export of the EPZ in both country (16).  In
view of the declining export earnings in the labor-intensive industries, however,Taiwan had decided to shift
to the production of higher value-added products both inside and outside the EPZs. The establishment of
Science Park near Taipei aimed at encouraging research and development of high technology was the efforts
initiated by the Government along this line. Korea introduced more or less similar policy. However, as
offered tax incentives and other motives expired, the relative importance of the EPZ had began to gradually
decline in spite of increased inflow of FDI.  This phenomenon seems to indicate that as country developed,
the comparative advantages offered by the zones in terms of infrastructure and special privileges. would
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diminish the role of EPZs and result in their being more or less indistinguishable from the rest of the country.
Ⅱ.  Economic Performance of the SEZs
1.  Economic development in Guangdong, Fujian and Hainan Provinces
  Of all economic reform measures and open policies implemented since the late 1970s, the most important
contribution to remarkable economic growth achieved in Guangdong, Fujian and Hainan provinces was the
establishment of the SEZ which had provided a focus to investment activity, both domestic and foreign.
Growth rates of GDP and industrial production in three provinces with SEZs were much higher than the
national average (Table-1).
  China, the largest recipient of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the developing world, actually had
received the cumulative amount of US$128.1 billion of FDI between 1979 and 1995, which accounted for
over 40 % of all FDI directed to all developing countries (17). But the distribution of the FDI flowed into
China was geographically concentrated. The coastal areas accounted for over 90% of all FDI received since
1979. Among coastal regions, Guangdong, Fujian, Shanghai and Jiangsu have been major hosts to substantial
amounts of FDI. Above all, Guangdong took the lion's share. During the first 10 year period (1979 - 87) after
the reform, about 60 % of the total FDI flowed into Guangdong, and 10% into Fujian Province (18) (Pomfret,
1989).  In terms of cumulative FDI up to 1992, Guangdong comes first on regional basis, accounting for
40 % (US$12.1 billion) of the total inflow (US$30.3 billion), followed by Fujian with the share of
10 %(US$ 2.9 billion) (Table- 2). Towards the late 1980s and onwards, the FDI inflow into Guangdong
Province had grown larger but its share of total FDI continued to decline from 60%(1979-87) to 40% (1979-
92) because of increasing regional dispersion of FDI since the mid-1980s as fourteen open coastal cities and
three open economic zones were established and as the Government adjusted the regional distribution of FDI
by sector. Hainan Province, in contrast, designated as the fifth SEZ in 1988 had started to develop by
introducing an increasingly large volume of FDI, but the size of FDI inflow was still limited and its growth
was much slower than its counterpart in Guangdong and Fujian (Tables- 2, - 10). The Hainan economy with
Its small size and its lower level of industrial output is still far behind Guangdong and Fujian.
Industrial Policy in Transitional Economy : The Role of China’s Special Economic Zone in Economic Development (Part I) 139
Table- 1  GDP and Industrial Production :China and Provinces with SEZ
  (100 million yuan)
1980 1985 1990 1995
GDP 4,518 8,964 18,531 58,261 9.8
Industrial production 5,154 9,716 23,924 91,894 14.9
GDP 250 577 1,559 5,734 14.4
Industrial production 234 505 1,907 7,458 21.7
GDP 87 200 523 2,160 23.9
Industrial production 81 173 531 2,881 26.9
GDP 19 57* 102 364 21.8
Industrial production 7 21* 44 177 24.1
Fujian
Hainan
National
Guangdong
(1980-95)
Annual average
growth rate (%)
(1979-94)
(1979-96)
(1980-95)
Note: 1. Figures with * indicate the 1987 data. 2. Average growth rates of Fujian and Hainan were computed
based on current price, whereas National and Guangdong growth rates were official figures from the
yearbook. Current price figures tend to be much higher.
Source: China Statistical Yearbook, various issues. Guangdong Statistical Yearbook, various issues.  Fujian
Statistical Yearbook, various issues. Hainan Statistical Yearbook, various issues.
Table – 2  Chinese FDI Inflows by Region
(Cumulative FDI in China)  (US$ Million)
Region 1985 1987 1989 1990 1991 1992 Total Per Capita*
Coastal 1,181.42 1,578.44 3,107.03 3,201.33 4,092.21 10,046.50 27,455.99 54.35
Guangdong 651.31 736.87 1,252.06 1,582.31 1,942.88 3,701.11 12,051.49 184.70
Fujian 118.60 55.35 348.03 348.89 472.16 1,423.64 2,944.64 75.25
Jiangsu 33.47 86.35 126.93 133.97 219.22 1,463.24 2,222.45 32.16
Beijing 88.82 105.79 320.16 278.95 244.95 349.85 2,041.41 185.25
Shanghai 107.54 214.01 422.12 174.01 145.19 493.61 1,938.55 144.13
Hainan ------ ----- 94.97 103.02 176.72 425.55 944.70 137.71
Other regions　　　　　　　　　　------　　　　(data skipped)　　　　------
Inland 136.09 203.75 330.30 234.82 333.71 957.52 2,838.51 4.30
Total 1,317.51 1,782.19 3,437.33 3,436.15 4,425.92 11,004.02 30,294.50 25.99
Notes: Figures with * indicate per capita US dollar income as of 1992.  Total includes the figures of other
regions.
Source: China Statistical Yearbook. various issues.
1- 1  Guangdong Province
  Economic development in Guangdong Province with three SEZs (Shenzhen, Zhuhai and Shantou) was
quite dramatic with the average growth rate of GDP of 14.2 % between 1978 and 1995, which is by far
greater than the national average of 9.9 %.  Before the reform was implemented, Guangdong Province
ranked 6th nationally in 1978 in terms of GDP, accounting for only 5 % of China's total GDP, but its rapid
growth raised the Province to rank no.1 in 1995 with its enlarged share of 9.3 % of national GDP (19)(Table –
3).  External trade of Guangdong Province grew at a faster rate than the national average, resulting in no.1
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among all the provinces in terms of the volume of exports. Economic performance of Guangdong was far
better by all accounts than that of national China as shown in the Table – 3.  Guangdong accounted for 38 -
40 % of China's total exports In the mid-1990s (Table - 4). A rapid economic development in Guangdong
was predominantly led by impressive growth realized in three SEZs especially Shenzhen with its enlarged
shares in the Province during 1980-95 period (Tables – 5,  - 6).  Most spectacular growth achieved in
Shenzhen SEZ was expansion of exports and industrial output which had increased over 1000 times between
1980 and 1996 (computed at current price). A rapid rate of economic development in Shenzhen was
principally achieved by a large volume of FDI inflow and exports expansion.
Table- 3  Macro Economic Indicators of Guangdong with the National Average
(annual average rate of growth)     (%)
Guangdong China Share of Guangdong
1991-95 1978-95 1991-95 1978-95 1978 1995
Population 1.7 1.7 1.2 1.4 5.3 5.6
GDP 19.1 14.2 12.0 9.9 5.1 9.3
(per capita)(Yuan) (365) (7,927) (373) (4,810) (0.98) (1.65)
Agricul. Production 5.7 6.7 6.7 (a) 6.7 6.1 7.1
Industrial Production 32.4 21.9 22.2 (a) 15.7 4.7 9.9
Invest. In fixed Asset 43.6 29.0 34.7 (a) 22.9 4.2 12.0
Exports 31.9 22.2 19.1 17.4 14.2 37.2
Foreign capital Utiliz. 43.0 (b) 30.9 36.1 (b) 26.3 19.8 25.1
Budget revenue 37.1 17.7 16.3 10.6 3.5 6.2
Note:   1.GDP, agricultural and industrial production is real terms, but the rest is nominal.
       2. Figures (a) are for 1980-95, and figures (b) are for 1985-95.
       3. Per capita GDP figures are nominal value of 1978 and 1995.
       4. Figures in the parenthesis are per capita income in Yuan.
       5. Abbreviations:  Agricul.=  Agricultural,  Invest.= Investment,  Utiliz.=Utilization.
Source: Derived from China Statistical Yearbook 1996, and Guangdong Statistical Yearbook 1996.
Table- 4  Import and Export by Location of China’s Foreign Trade
(US$Billion)
1994 1995 1996
Region Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports
National Ranking 121.0 115.6 148.8 132.1 151.1 138.8
(100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%)
1. Guangdong 50.2 46.5 56.6 47.3 59.3 50.6
Share (%) (41.4) (40.2) (38.0) (35.8) (39.2) (36.5)
2. Beijing 8.3 20.9 10.2 26.8 8.1 22.2
3. Shanghai 9.2 8.9 12.9 11.4 13.0 14.1
4. Fujian 6.4 5.8 7.9 6.5 8.4 7.1
Share (%) (5.2) (5.0) (5.3) (4.9) ( 5.6) (5.1)
Notes : Figures in the parenthesis are percentage shares.
Source : Derived and calculated from the figures in China Statistical Yearbook 1997.
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Table- 5  The share of Shenzhen SEZ in Guangdong Province (%)
1980 1995 1980 1995
Population 0.6 5.1 Export 0.5 36.3
GDP 1.1 16.6 Import 1.7 38.6
Inflow of FDI 22.7 12.7
Source : Data derived and computed from Guangdong Statistical Yearbook 1997, and Statistics
and Information Yearbook of Shenzhen 1998.
Table - 6   Shenzhen :    Macro Economic Indicators
1980 1985 1990 1995 1996
Population (10,000) 33.29 88.15 201.94 345.12 358.48
GDP (10,000 yuan) 27,012 390,222 1,716,665 7,956,950 9,500,446
Per capita Disposable Income (yuan)
(Urban resident) --- 1,915 4,127 12,771 16,296
Gross Industrial Output (10,000 yuan)
10,632 246,662 2,202,180 12,264,893 14,276,969
Consumer Price Index
(1979=100) 105.0 167.2 331.2 584.1 629.1
Export (US$10,000) 1,124 56,340 815,165 2,052,736 2,120781
Import(US$10,000) 627 74,292 754,971 1,824,224 1,784,561
FDI  (US$10,000) 2,755 17,989 38,994 130,989 205,065
Equity Joint Venture 252 6993 26,849 33,120 89,228
CJV 1,891 10,316 4,917 28,003 26,776
WFO 612 680 7,228 69,866 89,061
Note : FDI=Foreign Direct Investment. CJV=Cooperative Joint Venture. WFO=100% foreign owned.
Source : Statistics and Information Yearbook of Shenzhen 1998
1- 2  Fujian Province
  Fujian province, a hometown of hundreds of thousands of overseas Chinese, one of least developed areas
in the country before the reform, had also achieved rapid economic development apparently spurred by the
establishment of the SEZ in Xiamen area. The reform-and-open policy was responsible for accelerated
growth in the region, raising the average annual growth rate from 11% during the 1980 -1990 period to
19.3 % during the 1990 –1995 period with a resultant rise of GDP from one of the lowest rank in the country
to 11th in 1995(Table- 7).  Fujian ‘s annual average growth rate of GDP was enhanced drastically to 19 %
in the first half of 1990s, almost twice as high as the rate recorded during the previous decade (1980s),
enabling a significant increase in industrial production (annual average rate of growth: 30.2%).  This rapid
growth was achieved predominantly by an increasingly huge inflow of FDI (annual rate of increase of 131%
in 1990-95), which had in due course brought forth a rapid increase in export. Export share of primary goods
was reduced to half from 45% to 20% in ten years(1985-1995), while the export share of industrial goods was
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on gradual increase from 55 % to 80% (Table- 8).
  Fujian Province, as a result, had become one of the major centers of international trade in the country to be
ranked 4th in 1994 having successfully achieved the targeted goal as early as in 1992 to increase its regional
GDP four times by year 2000 (Table - 4).    The size of FDI inflow and industrial production in Xiamen
SEZ remained relatively small through the mid-1980s however it accelerated in the early 1990s. A dramatic
increase in export had taken place reaching from US$140 million (1980) to US$3.48 billion (1995)(Table- 9).
Table – 7  Macro Economic Indicators of Fujian Province
(annual average rate of growth)   (%)
1980-90 1990-95 1996-2000 (9th  5-year Plan)
　　GDP 11  19.3  11
Industrial Production 17.3  30.2  13
Agricultural Production  7  10.1   5
　Budget Revenue 13.8  26.3  11
　External trade 19.9  35.9  14
Inflow of  FDI * 16.8 131.0 150.0
Price Change  7.8  14.4   8
Note : FDI* indicates 100 million US dollars of Foreign Direct Investment.
Source : Jetro Hong Kong (1997)
Table - 8   Fujian : Composition of Export Items
(%)
Items 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Primary goods 44.7 21.8 21.8 18.0 16.0 18.5 20.3
 Industry goods 55.3 78.2 78.2 82.0 84.0 81.5 79.7
 1)Heavy Industry goods 18.6 27.4 23.1 21.4 22.8 21.2 22.2
 2)Light Industry goods 34.1 48.6 53.4 59.5 61.2 60.3 41.0
Source: Fujian Statistical Yearbook 1996
Table - 9  Fujian :  Major Indicators of Xiamen SEZ
1980 1985 1990 1995
Industrial production (million yuan) 9.66 21.85 64.91 337.65
FDI (million yuan) 3.63 36.50 247.18
Export (US$ 10,000) 14,027.00 16,527.00 78,148.00 347,915.00
Foreign Capital actually used (US$ 10,000) 8,624.00 7,273.00 161,823.00
Item
Source: Fujian Statistical Yearbook 1996
(To be continued in the No.61 issue.)
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Notes:  (Part I)
1)  Average annual rate of growth was 10.2% between 1981 and 1991, and 12.0% between 1991 and 1995. China
Statistical Yearbook 1996.
Conversion of China’s currency ‘‘RMB Yuan’ into US dollar is complicated. China has changed her exchange rate
several times. Until 1980 several exchange rates were used for trade transactions. After a single exchange rate was
established in 1981, the official exchange rate was progressively devalued until 1984 when the rates were unified. In
1986 official exchange rate was pegged to the US dollar. But by 1993 the official exchange rate had depreciated 33%
more than in 1986 and 70% more than in 1980.  Bell=Khor=Kochhar(1993). Pp.35-37.
Sample average exchange rates of RMB Yuan against US dollars are as follows.
In1981, 100 S dollars =170.50 RMB yuan, while in 1995, 100 US dollars = 835.10 RMB yuan.  China Statistical
Yearbook 2001.
2)  Fourteen open coastal cities include Dalian, Qinhuangdao, Tianjin, Yantai, Qingdao,  Lianyungang, Nantong,
Shanghai, Ningbo, Wenzhou, Fuzhou, Guangzhou, Zhanjiang and Beihai. Foreign capitals or firms such as EJVs
(Equity joint ventures), CJVs (Cooperativejoint ventures) and WFOEs(wholly foreign owned enterprises) in these
cities paid only 80% of the current enterprise-income tax applied to local firms. If these ventures were located in the
economic and Technical development districts within these cities, the tax rate was only 15%. Wei=Liu (2001). P.15.
3)  A gradual opening of the economy followed by setting up new economic zones after the SEZ which can be classified
as one type of open economic zone.  Beside SEZ and open coastal cities, there are delta areas and the development
zones (opened since 1992) in this category. Bell=Khor=Kochhar(1993). p.33.
4)  According to Wang , the conceptual inception of the SEZ can be dated back to the 19th century treaty ports which
played a significant role in the economy. Wang(1993).
5)  Deng Xiaoping noted in June 1985 that the SEZs were "experiments" and as such they   might fail. If so, China
would have to learn from that experience.
6)  Foreign firms in SEZs were provided with following attractions. (a) exemption from  import/export duties and from
after-tax profit remittance, (b)tax rates were 15%, (c) wages 75-80% lower than in Hong Kong, (d) foreign personnel
pay no taxes. Walters(1997). pp.52-53.
7)  Asian EPZs was first established at Kaohshiung, Taiwan in 1966 based on Mr.Li's idea.  Korean EPZs were
established, according to Li , at the advice of Mr.Li from whom Korean officials studied Taiwan EPZ.  First Korean
EPZ was set up at Masan in 1970. Li (1990).
8)  Chi-kang Wang’s congratulatory address at the 30th anniversary of the Installation of Kaoshiung EPZ.  Taiwan
Ministry of Economic Affairs(1996).
9)  The SEZs could approve a project of up to RMB 50 million in heavy industry and up to RMB 30 million in light
industry. Wei=Liu(2001).  Local authorities in SEZs are allowed to attract foreign investors through preferential
policies. Bell=Khor=Kochhar (1993).
10) Johansson (1994).
11) Asian Productivity Organization(1983). P.8
According to Shoesmith, the central tactic of the broader EOI strategy stressed the basic elements as follows:
1)  Emphasis on the rapid expansion of exports,
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2)  Free international trade,
3)  A free, 'open door' environment for foreign companies in the less developed countries.  Shoesmith(1986)
12) The total number of world export processing zones(or free export zones) increased from about 200 to over 300 in more
than 75 countries during the1980 – 1990 decade. UNCTC(1991).
13) For example, during the 13 years until 1979, 116 factories closed down, 33  electronics, 26 plastics and leather, 22 leisure
goods, 21 garments etc.. Asian Productivity Organization (1983).  According to the ESCAP estimates made in the early
80s, there may be more than 50 EPZs located in almost every country in the region by the year 2000. UN ESCAP (1985).
14) Asian Productivity Organization(1983).
15) Taiwan Ministry of Economic Affairs(1996).
16) Taiwan Ministry of Economic Affairs(1996). Korea Ministry of Industry and Trade (1998).
The shares of EPZ exports in the total exports of Taiwan and Korea are quite substantial respectively. The export value
of Taiwan’s EPZs accounted for 6% (1986) and 5.6%(1995) of Taiwan total exports and the export value of Masan
EPZ accounted for about 4% (1978) and 2% (1995) of Korea total exports.  The Central Bank of China(1999),
Taiwan Ministry of Economic Affairs(1996) and Korea Ministry of Industry and Trade (1998).
17) Out of this total value of inflow of FDI, it is estimated that about one fourth is so called 'round-ripping' FDI which
actually originated from domestic sources but returning as foreign, simply to take advantage of the tax incentives
provided to foreign-invested firms.  Broadman=Sun (1997).
18) This figure for 1979 - 87 is only contract base. Pomfret(1989).
19) In 1996 Guangdong's GDP recorded 6,519 million Yuan which ranked 1st in the country,  followed by Jiangsu (6,004
million yuan) and Shandong (5,960).  Fujian's GDP was 2,606 million Rmb.  China Statistical Yearbook 1997.
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